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THE ELECTRONIC FABRIC OF RESISTANCE: A CONSTRUCTIVE 
NETWORK OF ONLINE USERS AND ACTIVISTS CHALLENGING A 
RIGID COPYRIGHT REGIME * 
Kwang-Suk Lee 
 
In South Korea law and policy on intellectual property (IP) has been entirely 
subordinated to international agreements and the interests of domestic IP holders. 
Since the mid-1990s the Korean government has affiliated with international 
intellectual property institutions and has been rapidly incorporated into a 
worldwide IP system that aims to monopolize the nonmaterial resources of the 
knowledge society. South Korea became a party to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) in 1995, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works in 1996, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Copyright Treaty in 2004. Heedless of the communicative needs of its citizens to 
share freely all kinds of material and immaterial assets, the Korean government has 
sought to gain a share in the new imperial power of global capital. The wholesale 
subordination of the Korean government to the international IP system is at odds 
with the public’s interest in free cultural expression. Vastly expanding citizens’ 
liability for copyright infringement and the privatization of the public domain has 
produced a general chilling effect on citizens’ rights, such as criticism, 
commentary, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. The Korean IP 
regime, thus, has alienated the public’s rights to intellectual assets, which are 
essential to a democratic society.  
                                         
*  This paper was written for as a chapter in Kidd, D., Rodriguez, C. and Stein, L. (Ed.), Making Our 
Media: Mapping Global Initiatives toward a Democratic Public Sphere (Volume II: Citizens’ 
Movements and the Democratization of the Public Sphere), Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. 
In South Korea social conflicts arising from IP issues erupted over the 
revised Korean Copyright Act of 2004, which strictly banned the uploading or 
sharing of copyrighted music files, visual images, and video clips on individual 
blog sites, online fan club cafés, and personal Web sites. The revised Copyright Act 
was passed without any attempt to seek public consensus on the issue. When it 
came into effect in early 2005, Internet users resisted copyright holders and the 
politicians who had pushed the law through the parliament by spontaneously 
organizing countercopyright Internet cafés (voluntary online gatherings organized 
around shared interests), staging a one-person picket protest in relays in front of the 
parliament building, and holding electronic teach-ins. Internet users considered the 
enforcement of the rigid copyright law an attempt at social control comparable to 
the political shackles imposed by the earlier military regimes that ruled South 
Korea until the 1990s.  
This chapter examines the autonomous activities of Internet users to counter 
the new IP regime, specifically, how Internet users and civil rights groups joined 
together early in 2005 to construct a widespread network of resistance against the 
2004 Copyright Act. During the first quarter of 2005, Internet users’ 
counteractivities were spontaneous and voluntarily interconnected without any help 
from the civil rights movement. The users’ activities sprang spontaneously from 
anger that the government’s IP regime would deprive them of their rights of 
cultural expression, which had previously faced little regulation. Later, the 
widespread resistance of Internet users to the government’s policies transformed 
into a united front with civil rights groups against the IP regime. Moreover, the 
users’ actions provided the momentum to hammer out an alternative license model, 
which civil rights groups designed for the purpose of softening the rigid copyright 
system. My focus here is on the context and the chronology of events and issues in 
late 2004 and especially in early 2005 that led to the rise of e-resistance in South 
Korea. To add depth to this examination, I also refer to in-depth interviews of 
opinion leaders in civil rights groups who were deeply involved in organizing the 
resistance of Internet users.1 
In my investigation of Internet users’ activities targeted at a specific 
sociocultural agenda both online and offline, I adopt Hardt and Negri’s (2004) 
concept of the multitude—a new social class that attempts to mobilize a network 
with its neighbors in order to obtain a set of resources with which to build a 
political project by itself. This concept was originally used to describe a unified 
power of many voices resisting global capitalism, but here the concept is applied to 
the many and varied citizen stakeholders who resisted the current trajectory of the 
South Korean IP regime.   
This study stresses the importance of looking at how different citizens, 
whether individual Internet users, online activists groups, or offline civil rights 
groups, worked together to articulate an alternative vision of copyright. The Korean 
experience of resistance to the IP regime suggests that there is limited value in 
illegally sharing copyrighted intellectual works among users; what is really needed 
is to explore ways to legitimate a model of sharing creative works that is more 
open, more liberating, and more conducive to democracy and a free culture. The 
solidarity of Internet users and online activist groups in organizing both online and 
offline protests and in developing an alternative licensing model offers an example 
of how to resist copyright policies tailored exclusively to the economic demands of 
the global market.  
 
From Political Democracy to Cultural Expression 
After being liberated from the twenty-six-year Japanese military occupation (1919–
1945), Korea was split into two nations through civil war in 1950, and the country 
was left in ashes. Korea had little experience of the representative system of 
democracy found in advanced Western countries, and this political immaturity 
enabled a series of autocratic governments to wield oppressive power over the 
citizens. In South Korea the first authoritarian and military regimes during the 
period from 1948 to 1992 were based on the disciplinary logic of confinement, 
censorship, centralization, and physical violence (Lee, 2007). The government’s 
resort to physical violence sparked movements for political democracy, particularly 
after widespread street protests against corrupt politicians in the mid-1970s.   
In South Korea, up through at least the early 1990s, the grid of military-
authoritarian practices that threatened citizens’ rights was pervasive: for instance, 
the national ID system identifying each Korean, the use of paramilitary violence to 
break worker unions, the use of closed-circuit television for policing, the 
widespread practice of government eavesdropping, and politically motivated 
investigations of activist citizens. During the 1970s and 1980s, the regime in power 
employed a wide variety of means to compel most citizens to become docile 
subjects, imposing a curfew, forcibly shearing the hair of “hippies,” torturing 
political activists, searching citizens’ possessions on the street, and silencing the 
voice of leftists in the public arena. During the dark days of these repressive 
military regimes, Korean citizens were eager to have more political rights, such as 
freedom of speech, expression, and assembly.  
After entering into a stable phase of civilian government, the public’s 
interest shifted from focusing on demands for political democracy to the protection 
of cultural expression. This shift can be viewed as an extension of democratic 
concerns into a new cultural arena. With the widespread dissemination of digital 
communications in the 1990s and 2000s, Koreans have discovered the freedom 
afforded by electronic conduits of cultural expression. The eruption of sociocultural 
exchange spurred by the mobility and interconnectivity of new communication 
technologies has acclimated citizens to speaking out in their own voices and 
expressing their own values. The ecology of the citizens’ autonomous culture has 
shifted from the street barricade struggle of resisting authoritarian regimes by 
throwing stones and Molotov cocktails to resisting the dominant discourses of 
society through electronic forms of cultural expression such as the Internet café, 
electronic forums, blogs, and text messaging with mobile phones. In the process, 
Koreans have become “citizens of the Internet,” or “netizens.”  
The swift change in the public culture has been facilitated by the Korean 
government’s policy drive to shift the national economy from traditional labor-
intensive industries to cultural or knowledge-based economies (Lee, 2006). For 
instance, in 1999, to promote broadband Internet networks at the national level, the 
Korean government and the Ministry of Information and Telecommunication 
launched the Cyber Korea 21 (CK21) project aimed at creating a “knowledge-based 
society” in order to improve “national competitiveness” and raise “the quality of 
life to the level of the more advanced nations” (NCA, 2002: 79). CK21 increased 
policy support for building IT businesses, established policy goals for advanced 
information and communication economies, and set forth guidelines for 
information technology (IT) growth. And, in fact, the quality of life was improved 
by the rapidly increasing economic opportunities arising from access to commercial 
broadband Internet made possible by the implementation of major electronic 
networks for e-commerce. In 2003 CK21 evolved into the E-Korea Vision 2006 (E-
KV06), the goal of which is both to promote the “information society” at the 
national level and to gain “strong ties of international cooperation toward the global 
information society” (NCA, 2003: 10). Recently the government has launched the 
slogan “U(biquitous)-Korea,” which is intended to encourage the integration of all 
communication systems and electronic devices. The government hopes thereby to 
promote the image of South Korea as one of the world’s most developed Internet 
and wireless nations. Meanwhile, in 2005 the Ministry of Culture and Tourism 
published a “white paper” describing the “C-Korea 2010” vision of a so-called 
creative or cultural national economy (MCT, 2005). It aims to encourage foreign 
exports of Korean music, dramas, and film, promoting Korean entertainers in the 
Asian entertainment market and installing international trade fairs and film and 
leisure-sports festivals in major cities designated as international cities of culture or 
tourism. Moreover, the Korean government aims to further economic development 
by adopting Western copyright regimes that are highly protective of copyright 
owners. Displaying an economic reductionism of culture, the Korean government 
identifies “culture” with having a highly profitable entertainment industry and sees 
enormous advantages stemming from the industrialization of culture. The economic 
role of Korea as a major Asian hub of the cultural industries explains why the 
South Korean government voluntarily conformed to this global intellectual property 
system. However, the government’s embrace of the Western copyright system 
resulted in suppressing the Korean people’s burgeoning cultural expression on the 
Internet.  
Due to the government’s neoliberal IT policies (largely characterized by the 
privatization of the state-owned telecommunication infrastructures, a retreat from 
social welfare programs, and extreme IT commercialization by the private sector), 
the number of mobile phone and Internet users is rapidly growing in South Korea. 
As of January 2005 there were more than 36.5 million registered mobile phone 
users in a population of 48 million and more than 7 out of 10 households had 
broadband Internet access. In fact, many Koreans spend a good deal of time on 
electronic networks—playing online games in the Internet café, decorating their 
blogs, communicating with each other using mobile devices, connecting with 
hobby or interest groups through Internet portal sites, and exchanging audiovisual 
materials with others. Most significant is the sharp increase on the Korean Internet 
of political criticism and commentary, such as that found on amateur online 
journalism and parody sites that monitor, critique, and ridicule corrupt politicians 
or autocratic actions of governmental officials. This constant communication 
through electronic media and the rise of a culture of free expression via these media 
laid the groundwork for fierce antipathy to IP regimes among Korean netizens 
(Lee, 2005). The new digital culture of Koreans has gradually developed into a 
more democratic vision of culture, one that goes beyond merely providing 
profitable entertainment. 
           
e-Empire versus the Multitude 
Before examining the specific instance of resistance to the IP regime in Korea, it 
will be useful to give a Marxist and critical political economy view of the 
relationship between cultural goods and capitalism. This view allows us to 
understand why struggles over intellectual property have become increasingly 
acute. Following the age of “imperialism,” which was based on the colonialist 
mechanism of dominance and dependency through the forcible occupation of 
physical geographies, we have entered into the new age of “Empire,” in which, 
through the economic domination of global capitalism, “rule has no limits” and 
“encompasses the spatial totality” of the globe (Hardt & Negri, 2000: xiv). In the 
new age of Empire, the sovereignty of nation-states has declined, and global 
capitalism has begun to make profits mainly by immaterial labor—intellectual labor 
leading to the production of cultural goods that must be protected by powerful 
intellectual property laws in order to realize market prices (Hardt & Negri, 2004: 
109). What is significant is not so much the expropriation of value—traditionally 
accomplished by having laborers work more hours than wages covered or by 
extracting more labor power in less time—as “the capture of value that is produced 
by cooperative labor and that becomes increasingly common through its circulation 
in social networks” throughout the world (Hardt & Negri, 2004: 113; emphasis 
added). Examples of the capture of value produced by cooperative labor are the 
Hollywood film production system and Microsoft’s software production. Castells 
(1996) delineates the transformation of capitalist accumulation from sweatshop 
economies to knowledge-based economies and comments on both the possibilities 
and the limitations of the information and communication technologies. Castells’s 
concept of informational capitalism as a new mode of capitalist development 
indicates the new linkage between information/culture and productive force, the 
linkage by which information/culture in this new phase of capitalism becomes the 
essential element for “smart” productive processes and for the commercialization of 
information/culture itself.  
The industrial age based on the hardware of production has been 
transformed into the new age of “soft(ware)” and cultural production (Kroker & 
Kroker, 1996: 75–88). The expropriation and privatization of the common cultural 
assets of humankind have become the ultimate goal of “cognitive” or 
“informationalized” capitalism, a mode of capitalism that depends primarily on the 
commercialization of information/culture and its protection by intellectual property 
mechanisms (Dyer-Witheford, 2005; Schiller, 2007). The unlimited desire of 
capitalism will be perpetuated as long as it can discover new frontiers of 
commercialization. Virilio (1997: 119–45) describes how the incessant desire of 
modern capitalism has been promoted by “speed” and “mobility.” Enabled by the 
speed of electronic networks, the effect of “temporal-spatial compression” (Harvey, 
1990: 121–200) facilitates the production and exchange of immaterial products 
such as financial capital, electronic business data, and entertainment content. 
Moreover, the global conduit of electronic communications becomes the material 
infrastructure of contemporary global capitalism, allowing immaterial labor 
products to be disseminated throughout the world.    
To designate global power that has been both modulated through the media 
and networks and brought about by the private appropriation of intellectual labor, 
some cultural theorists call the current global capitalism the “electronic Empire” or 
“eEmpire” (Raley, 2004) or the “information empire” (Poster, 2004). The new 
electronic mode of global capitalism is sustained by “a loose assemblage of 
relations characterized by . . . flexibility, functionality, mobility, programmability, 
and automation” (Raley, 2004: 132). The assemblage of loose but integrated 
communication networks serves as an “instrumental facilitator of Empire” (135). 
Within the global geography of the electronic Empire, Korea’s functional value is 
as a nodal point both for disseminating the ideas of the quasi-governmental nerve 
centers—such global regulatory entities as the WTO, the WIPO, and TRIPs—and 
for making profits through the export of information/culture goods into the 
developing Asian countries. Since the mid-1990s Korean IP policies have been 
entirely subordinated to supranational economic institutions that represent the 
global economic order of intellectual property regimes. The rapid enlistment of 
Korea into the new “global quasi-government” (Hardt & Negri, 2004: 175) 
signifies the increasing power of these global institutions that mediate among 
nation-states so as to build a knowledge-based economic order. In making laws and 
judicial decisions about property rights related to digital information, Korean 
technocrats and courts have gradually internalized the policies and rulings that the 
supranational economic institutions seek to legitimate without considering what is 
best for the Korean public. For instance, the Copyright Act has been revised eleven 
times since its enactment, responding to the demands of the global IP regime.  
The incorporation of Korean information technology and cultural policies 
into a new imperial mode of production is far from the normative role of the state 
as a public mediator, which guarantees the equal rights of the citizen and which 
thus should defend citizens’ common intellectual heritage against the losses caused 
by an overly restrictive IP regime. The public commons is “the body of creative 
works and other knowledge—writing, artwork, music, science, inventions, and 
others—in which no person or organization has any proprietary interest” 
(Wikipedia, 2005). The rapid privatization of the commons was the collaborative 
work of proprietary desire and governmental support, expanding the powers of 
government and private interests while the citizens’ access to these resources was 
diminished.  
Despite the structural metamorphosis of capitalism from a concentrated 
“accumulation of power by the sovereign” under the old system of imperialism 
“towards the dispersal of power”  throughout the world market under the new 
electronic system of Empire (Miller & Yúdice, 2004: 5), the dominant network of 
Empire and, within it, the momentum of resistance by the oppressed always 
coexist. In their second volume of Multitude, Hardt and Negri (2004: 36–62) note 
that the network of Empire is simultaneously a description of the physical conduit 
for contemporary global power and the necessary form of counterinsurgencies 
opposed to this power. In other words, “power and resistance both have the same 
form and can thus appear indistinguishable” (Brown & Szeman, 2005: 380). 
Ironically, the same electronic infrastructures set up for the global markets of 
Empire have been used for free speech by “‘new subjectivities’ [that] are formed 
through [the] media and networks” (Poster, 2004: 324).  
 “The living alternative that grows within Empire” is designated “the 
multitude” by Hardt and Negri (2004: xiii). The multitude encompasses all classes 
that desperately resist the dominance of Empire. Plurality and internal differences 
that form multiple networks of resistance characterize the multitude (xii–xvi, 99–
113). In other words, while the multitude is a set of singular individuals and groups 
(singularity/plurality), these individuals and groups work and act in common and 
share common goals (unity/commonality) (103, 105). Moreover, the multitude is 
not a fixed but an open, inclusive, expanding network that is mobilized in 
communication between one local struggle and another (213). Hardt and Negri 
describe the multitude as a “class” newly defined by ongoing resistance against 
Empire (103), a concept of class that goes beyond the orthodox Marxist concept of 
the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Brown and Szeman 
(2005: 377) consider the mode of organization indigenous to Hardt and Negri’s 
multitude as a “distributed network, more or less spontaneous and temporary 
alliances coordinating different agendas without a central command.” This network 
of resistance is quite expansive and open to embracing new groups that have 
various political and cultural voices. The networked multitude is well skilled in 
using modern technologies such as the Internet and wireless communications as 
“emancipatory media” (Terranova, 2004; Enzensberger, 1974: 95–128).  
   Hardt and Negri (2004: 87) describe the genealogy of modern forms of 
resistance: they have evolved from a unified and centralized structure through the 
polycentric model to the current distributed, or full-matrix, network structure of 
resistance. While emerging from within the new imperial sovereignty as the force 
of counter-Empire, the multitude mobilizes what it produces in common against the 
imperial power of global capital (Hardt & Negri, 2004: 101). The multitude creates 
a democratic solidarity, forming the electronic fabric of resistance so as to fight for 
a common agenda of resistance against the oppressive dimensions of global 
capitalism, simultaneously encouraging the multiple desires of each class, group, 
and individual. 
 
The Electronic Fabric of Resistance 
In Korea the formation of the multitude was brought about by reactions against the 
suppressive momentum of economic neoliberalism and the political conservatism 
of imperial capitalists and national policy makers, as well as by the strong feelings 
of the citizens about sociocultural agendas. Through technological advances such 
as the national installation of broadband Internet networks and the popular use of 
mobile handsets, Korea’s citizens are asserting public opinions and cultural styles, 
which were once only represented by conservative big media. Viewed through the 
lens of Hardt and Negri’s concept of the multitude of resistance, the recent Korean 
citizens’ movement enacted e-resistance by weaving together a spontaneous, 
indeterminate, informal, and complex network of singularities in order to act as a 
commonality. 
In the 2002 Korean presidential election, an election campaign using mobile 
phones was very effective in organizing citizens and uniting them on the agenda of 
political democratization. At that time, using their own cell phones, Korea’s 
younger citizens mobilized and encouraged friends, families, and peers to vote for 
the progressive candidate. The younger generation, those in their twenties and 
thirties, with access to instant messaging and e-mail engaged in a “mobile politics” 
that made use of wireless devices (Kim, 2003). Prior to the widespread distribution 
of electronic media that could be used for self-organized resistance, conservative 
big media had been the main source of influence over public opinion. The new 
wave of network politics has begun to allow anonymously scattered citizens to 
mobilize each other to protest against the politically conservative government. 
Patterns of organization among Korean netizens are mobile, rapid, network-based, 
interconnected, and nomadic, enabling them to speak freely in their own voices in 
both online and offline space. This new mode of resistance has allowed the 
multitude to express its anger toward social issues and to criticize the bureaucratic 
and myopic view of market-driven policies. Networked technology contributes to a 
common agenda by uniting citizens’ micro-narratives that are dispersed across 
physical space.  
Korean multitudes have demonstrated distinctive abilities “to capture the 
new technologies of power” (Poster, 2004: 329). Their methods of resistance are 
creating a new paradigm for the social participation of citizens. This new 
paradigm—spontaneous but unified action through the electronic network—has 
become both popular and powerful. Another example is, OhmyNews, a Korean 
online news site launched in 2000 with the editorial principle that “every citizen is 
a reporter,” has enlisted 38,000 “citizen reporters” who publish about 150 stories 
on the site each day (http://www.ohmynews.com). The Web site now draws half a 
million visitors a day and has become one of the alternative Internet media framing 
the public agenda. With the growth of guerrilla media on the Internet, electronic 
networks have been increasingly used for mobilizing enormous citizens’ rallies on 
socially sensitive issues. For instance, in June 2002 a citizens’ rally 
commemorating the tragic death of two teenaged girls struck by a U.S. military 
vehicle was initiated for the first time by one citizen’s online posting expressing 
anger at the presence of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea. The temporary rage was 
gradually transmitted to the online forums and cafés where citizens posted their 
opinions, discussed the political and military condition of Korea that caused the 
tragedy, and set the date for an offline rally. The staging of several rallies sparked a 
wave of anti-U.S. protests and later forced the government to scale down its plan to 
send Korean troops to Iraq. 
 
An Embryonic Phase of Resistance 
The formation of resistance against the IP regime stems from a growing 
commitment to free cultural expression in Korea. The wave of anti-IP resistance 
was relatively small in the scale of its offline protest as compared with two other 
cases of “e-mobilization,” the mobile democratic revolution during the presidential 
election of 2002 and the peaceful candlelight vigil protesting against U.S. troops in 
several major cities that same year. Nevertheless, the wave of anti-IP sentiment 
among Koreans during the first quarter of 2005 signaled the first resistance of 
Korean netizens to the IP regime. Today’s Korean online culture of resistance was 
greatly affected by the early e-mobilizations, and this online culture has gradually 
developed into a sphere for raising citizens’ political consciousness and for 
recognizing how the intellectual property regime severely constrains the cultural 
freedom of citizens.  
Between 1957, when the Copyright Act was first enacted in South Korea, 
and 2004, it has been revised eleven times—three of them since 2000. The 
trajectory of the act’s revisions can be summarized in a phrase: “the reinforcement 
of intellectual property rights” for the copyright owners and holders (Hong, 2005: 
9). In October 2004, without any public discussion on this sensitive issue, some 
conservative members of the Korean parliament pushed through a twelfth revision 
of the Copyright Act that dramatically increased copyright owners’ rights. The 
revision gave copyright owners an absolute monopoly over digital content and 
extended authors’ copyrights to the span of their lifetimes plus 45 years. On  
January 17, 2005, the revised Copyright Act, which included controversial 
provisions that rigidly applied proprietary rights to immaterial labors, took effect. 
Under the revised copyright law, copyright owners gain the rights of transmission 
of artistic products over the Internet and all mobile communication devices; anyone 
who enjoys the new culture of sharing can be prosecuted for copyright 
infringement. This has led to the policing of images uploaded for decorating Web 
sites, background sounds for blog sites, lyrics from commercial music, and essays 
copied from online newspapers or magazines. Even if such sharing is for 
individual, noncommercial purposes, the use of copyrighted works without their 
owners’ permission, such as uploading and linking others’ creative works, is 
illegal. 
Initially, Internet users responded by opening Web sites and Internet cafés 
for sharing information about the revised provisions of the act. However, the 
gradual growth of users’ anxieties about being subject to charges of copyright 
infringement developed into enormous anger at the rigid application of copyright. 
Another event simultaneously lit the fuse of citizens’ anger at the copyright agenda. 
Controversy was caused by the emotional question of whether the Korean national 
anthem should be protected by private property rights. The family of Eak-Tai Ahn, 
who composed the national anthem, owned the rights. Early in 2005 rumors 
circulated that the government was trying to purchase the rights to the anthem and 
the Ahn family was negotiating for royalties. In fact, since Ahn’s death in 1965, the 
law guaranteed the family a 50-year copyright term lasting until 2015. Most 
citizens were astonished to learn that the anthem was owned by one family, the 
Ahns, who live on an island east of Spain. Thousands of citizens organized online 
campaigns arguing free use of the anthem. Confronting the embarrassing situation 
of the rights to the Korean national anthem, “Aegukga,” public outcry arose against 
the copyright payments. Surrendering to public sentiment, the Ahn family donated 
the song’s copyright to the Korean people in March 2005.  
The incident left Korean citizens feeling that copyright law could prevent 
them from freely singing even their own national anthem without permission. 
Moreover, Korean citizens learned the unwelcome fact that when copyright owners 
demand their property rights to control a perceived communal cultural resource 
such as the national anthem, the government may have little power to intervene. 
The national anthem incident revealed that copyright can also act as an obstacle to 
cultural expression, and it fanned the antagonism of the Korean people against 
restrictive copyright law. The revised Copyright Act further compromised the free 
speech rights of Internet users by giving private corporations more power to control 
the production, circulation, and distribution of intellectual property.  
 
An Evolving but Ephemeral Phase of Resistance 
Compounded by the antagonism to copyright evoked by the debate over the 
national anthem, netizen protest against the 2004 Copyright Act gradually 
snowballed. Another intellectual property–related matter aroused citizens’ anger 
even further. In March 2005 three conservative politicians in parliament attempted 
to strengthen copyright holder rights again by proposing an even more restrictive 
version of the Copyright Act to supplant the 2004 version. The new move to favor 
copyright holders was actually a direct response to the WIPO’s Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), which aims at modernizing and protecting the 
copyright of music in the age of digital networks. In fact, the WIPO had urged the 
Korean government to ratify and implement the WPPT. The WPPT and the 
corresponding revision of the proposed Korean Copyright Act are aimed at 
controlling noncommercial radio stations, known as webcasters, on the Internet. 
These online stations had not been liable for copyright infringement before its 
enactment. Ironically, the politicians who proposed the new copyright regulations 
were criticized for hypocrisy because their own homepages were full of copyright 
infringements such as posting newspaper articles and background music without 
the permission of copyright holders—another blow against the legitimacy of the 
proposed copyright regime in the public’s eyes.   
This latest proposal ignited a campaign by a coalition of Internet users and 
Internet-based civil rights groups—including the Jinbo Network, the Civil Alliance 
for Cultural Reform (CACR), MediAct, and IPLeft—called the Disobedience to the 
Copyright Act campaign, which produced the “Joint Statement by Netizens on the 
Current Copyright Act.” Jeong-Woo Kim, executive director of IPleft, an activist 
group promoting alternatives to copyright, recalled active and autonomous 
response of netizens against the copyright legislation:  
Netizens were inactive and unorganized, but, when given the specific goal 
of opposing copyright, they organized autonomously and worked against 
copyright issues for quite a long time period. Through such Internet cafés as 
“No Music, No Blog!” (NMNB) and “Netizens are Not Copyright 
Criminals!” (NNCC), netizens expressed various opinions on the revised 
and proposed Copyright Acts on their electronic bulletin boards, and 
consulted together about sending protest emails to members of parliament 
who proposed the revised act and who worked for the Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism. Moreover, some moderators of the Internet cafés had attended 
an offline roundtable meeting [followed by a press interview] sponsored by 
activists from civil rights groups, and at that time, we decided to stage a 
one-person picket protest in relays in front of the parliament building. (Kim, 
interview, August 27, 2005) 
Kim’s comments describe how the unorganized individuals and groups on the 
Internet were gradually transformed into “multitudes” knowing how to enact their 
feelings of anger and how to empower their actions by cooperating with well-
organized activist groups. The two Internet cafés, NMNB and NNCC, 
spontaneously appeared in January 2005 and had grown into online community 
groups with memberships of 1,855 and 451, respectively, according to statistics 
posted on their official Web sites (available at 
http://cafe.naver.com/nomusicnoblog.cafe and http://cafe.daum.net/nethim). 
Moreover, some netizens emerged who designed alternative and not-for-profit uses 
of immaterial labor in digital capitalism: FreeBGM.net was created by a young 
netizen, calling himself “empty-headed hacker,” who campaigned for the sharing of 
noncommercial music. Within a few minutes after he launched his Web site 
campaign, 700 subscribers enlisted, and it began averaging 20,000 visitors per day. 
Some progressive musicians also started to waive their copyrights and to distribute 
mp3 music without any compensation.2 Despite their rapidly growing strength 
online, netizens’ anti-IP protests were a trifling matter to the offline world, 
especially in comparison to the rapid mobilization of citizens for rallies in major 
downtown streets in the 2002 presidential election and the candlelight vigil protests 
against U.S. troops. Byong-Il Oh, executive director of the Jinbo Network, a civil 
rights group, expressed his disappointment at the level of netizens’ offline action: 
“In the case of the one-person picket protest [against the copyright], actually, 
netizens’ attendance was low. It was mostly activists in the Jinbo Network, IPLeft, 
and the CACR who staged the picket protest in relays, with little netizen support” 
(Oh, interview, August 16, 2005). Jeong-Woo Kim also expressed the same opinion 
about netizens’ offline activities: 
While they actively resisted the copyright regime in online space, netizens 
were quite passive in offline activities. Netizens showed a coordinated and 
enormous power in e-resistance against copyright, but could not maintain 
such power in the long term. Their online actions also gradually vanished 
along with the fading of the copyright agenda framed by the media. (Kim, 
interview, August 27, 2005)  
.  By April 2005 the joint activities of netizens and civil rights groups had ceased, 
and the copyright issue was pursued by civil rights groups alone. For example, 
subsequent moves against the copyright regime, such as “A Forum for Enacting a 
Reasonable Copyright Act” held on April 4 and “A Written Opinion by Civil 
Rights Groups Concerning the Proposed Copyright Act” issued on April 25, saw 
more participation from traditional grassroots activists such as labor activist groups 
and critical artists groups than from general netizens. A netizen alliance against the 
copyright regime lasted the short span of three months (January–March 2005), 
although the anti-IP cafés have been maintained until the present day (October 
2005). If the cyberprotest of netizens was vibrant but ephemeral, was it ultimately 
meaningless? Although their e-resistance—establishing online protest groups, 
posting comments on the Web sites of IP-related institutions, announcing targeted 
politicians who were violating the revised Copyright Act, and sending e-mail 
criticizing the revised act to relevant officials—had a short life span, netizens 
showed a great deal of power to change the culture of society. The netizens’ 
stimulus led activist groups to more effectively construct the fabric of electronic 
resistance and thus to refuse the one-way flow of copyright enforcement. The 
problem is how to promote the possibilities of resistance constructed by anonymous 
netizens while avoiding their potential deficiencies—the lack of an offline presence 
and the short life span of their resistance.       
  
Toward a Metamorphosis of Resistance 
Figure 1 offers a time line of netizens’ e-resistance and civil rights activism against 
the revision of the Copyright Act, as well as the catalyzing national anthem issue.   
 
Figure 1. Timetable of Anti-Copyright Resistance in Korea  
 
The autonomous resistance movement of netizens in early 2005 forced policy 
makers to incorporate elements of free culture at the institutional level. For 
instance, it was October 2004 when IPLeft published the first official version of the 
alternative copyright license model called the Information Sharing License (ISL), 
aimed at embedding a radical vision of communitarian ownership in the current 
copyright system. The ISL allows copyright holders to grant some of their private 
rights to the public when releasing their works. It is an attempt to create tactically 
advantageous tools to cultivate public values adequate for a locally grounded 
copyright culture that could invade entirely privatized realms, but it had not been 
greatly popularized among netizens until early February 2005. Since then the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism announced that it would accept the ISL on its 
Web site, if IPLeft would refine the ISL in collaboration with the Commission for 
Copyright Deliberation and Conciliation (this commission, established under the 
Copyright Act of 1987, is, according to the official Web site, “in charge of the 
promotion of copyright and neighboring rights among artists at the policy level”). 
Such collaboration was previously unimaginable because policy issues related to 
copyright have been determined by the government alone, but IPLeft and the 
Copyright Commission worked on this project from April to August 2005, and 
IPLeft released the “ISL 2.0” in September that year. Won-Jae Lee, one of the 
secretaries-general in the Civil Alliance for a Cultural Reform (CACR), sees 
clearly the possibilities of netizen power: 
Unlike the traditional political movements of activists, [Korean] netizens’ 
resistance is deep in explosive power and wide in the coordinative pattern 
of self-organizing networks. The new pattern of resistance will encourage 
the awakening of a cultural consciousness that is deeply submerged in the 
average netizen, and ultimately the autonomous resistance of netizens will 
be used to widen the boundaries of the current anti-IP activist camp. Most 
of all, the flexible and multi-channel networks of coalition between activist 
groups and citizens could be a stimulus for forming counter-copyright 
movement in the longer term. (Lee, interview, August 21, 2005)  
While Lee emphasizes the protest pattern of netizens, Byong-Il Oh focuses on the 
leading role of the civil rights groups in forming a countercopyright movement: “If 
the public agenda of the civil rights groups could not evoke the reaction of netizens, 
this fact proves a weakness of the movement.” Therefore, he argues, “the overall 
project which will bring together netizens on the battle lines against copyright 
should be hammered out in the near future” (Oh, interview, August 16, 2005). 
Otherwise, both Lee and Oh view the short span of netizens’ e-resistance as a 
hindrance to mobilizing resistance. Lee noted that other contributors to the fragility 
of netizens’ resistance include the movement for customers’ rights—so-called 
lifestyle politics (Cheta, 2004)—and the depoliticized tendencies of protesting, 
which were often seen in the netizens’ demands for cost-free use of audiovisual 
data on the Web rather than for the removal of the copyright culture itself. Civil 
rights activists have access to a huge mobilizing force of netizens, but to use this 
resource effectively will require close collaboration between the political activism 
of civil rights groups and the enormous forces of netizens that could be brought to 
bear if facilitated by civil rights groups.  
 
Reconfiguring Cyberpolitics 
The present study traces the progress of an anticopyright campaign in early 2005. 
The following observations can be made on the evolution of e-resistance.  
(1) Although Internet user groups are often unstable and have short life 
spans, they created significant social momentum generated from the 
Internet-based free culture by using the electonic fabric of words. 
Eventually this had the effect of promoting the incorporation of the public 
license, or ISL 2.0, into Korean copyright policy through collaboration 
between IPLeft, a grassroots group, and the Copyright Commission, a 
regulatory institution.  
(2) The new conditions of resistance were favorable to a horizontal coalition 
between hard-core Internet users and civil rights activists on specific, 
targeted issues. Once Internet users, through blogs and other Web sites, 
made government policies an issue, civil rights activists supported their 
resistance against the copyright regime and extended their activities in a 
more cooperative way. They proposed alternative policies through a joint 
meeting, statement, and protest that essentially challenged the existing IP 
regime.  
(3) The time span from forming an agenda to organizing resistance is rapid 
due to the speed of communication in the Internet era. Netizens’ anger was 
facilitated by instant mobility, although their coordinated power withered in 
two or three months. Nevertheless, the upsurge of netizens’ e-resistance in 
early 2005 shifted government policy toward both embracing the public 
license model and reflecting the interests of the various stakeholders in the 
proposed copyright revision. 
The traditional model of street protests was employed during Koreans’ 
political struggles for radical democracy under the military regimes of the 1980s 
and early 1990s. The traditional tactics of resistance, such as barricade protests, 
political forums, colloquiums, and teach-ins have been revitalized by the electronic 
activism of Internet users and civil rights activists who use the Internet as a tool for 
public participation in democratic policy formation. Forms of resistance employed 
by Korean netizens in the resistance to the copyright regime, however, showed us 
the contrasting characteristics: By using new technologies and the opportunities for 
networking they create, the new electronic generation in Korea has found a path of 
resistance to capitalist commercialization of culture. In establishing Internet cafés 
and clubs, Korean netizens have learned how to appropriate the networks of e-
Empire to serve their own values such as free speech and the culture of free 
sharing, even though the scale of e-protest was confined within national 
boundaries. This e-resistance is a response to the current changes in capitalist 
power, which happens in the era of e-Empire to those of the “nomadic” model 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), relies on electronic networks of communication and 
organization, and seeks to capture and control cultural products. It is also an 
example of local resistance to an increasingly restrictive international regime of 
intellectual property rights. While the copyright regime has attempted to privatize 
the public domain of culture, the electronic resistance of the Korean “multitude” 
has cultivated the public domain of data, information, and knowledge as a 
democratic sanctuary. For instance, the public license model developed by IPLeft 
and the free culture campaign by FreeBGM.net in Korea are valuable endeavors 
aimed at creating an information commons in society that is not only a cultural 
heritage that allows anyone to use and build on the common resources of science, 
education, communications, and culture without permission but also a realm of a 
civil society that represents the public’s interests and discourages the granting of 
monopolies on information rights. These alternative experiments function as 
essential safety valves in society to protect citizens’ free expression from the profit-
driven privatization of intellectual resources. Moreover, the social push toward 
equal public rights of citizens who can freely speak about, use, adopt, modify, and 
create new works is conducive to creating a democratic ethic in society.  
The alternative space of the electronic network has vastly increased the 
power of collective resistance by allowing atomized and disconnected individuals 
to come together and find power in e-resistance. Moreover, the solidarity of 
autonomous user groups and online activist groups has revealed new possibilities 
for revitalizing the public domain as a resource of public goods for the citizenry, 
even in the midst of weak-kneed national IP policies and rigid international IP 
regimes catering to the software, music, and film industries. By examining the rise 
of e-resistance in Korea, this study has ascertained that it is now possible for a 
coalition of individual Internet users, online activist groups, and traditional civil 
rights groups to use the Internet as a tactical tool allowing the multitude to speak 
out in their own voices from below and to reconceptualize copyright policies in a 
way that benefits the public good. It remains to be seen, however, how far the new 
forms of e-resistance can instigate change without the reinforcement of the 
traditional model of public resistance in the streets. 
 
Notes 
1 E-mail or telephone interviews were performed using an open-ended informal 
questionnaire. The interviews aimed mainly at exploring the informants’ 
perspectives on the rigid IP regime and on the social scene of struggle occupied by 
the counter-IP resistance. 
2 At that time some Korean composers and singers who managed their own Web 
sites (e.g., Lunatiq.co.kr, chaekit.com, and songnlife.com) aggressively opened 
their mp3 files to free access on the Internet so as to protest against the enforcement 
of the rigid copyright regime (Oh, 2005).   
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